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MUTUALITY OF ESTOPPEL: ITS STATUS
IN NEBRASKA
I. INTRODUCTION
The binding effect of a judgment is said to be based upon the
principle that justice and expediency demand that a person who
has had his "day in court" should not be permitted to relitigate the
same issues in a subsequent action.1 However, a general rule existing concurrently with this principle has been that a person is
not entitled to claim the benefits of an adjudication of any matter
decided in an action to which he was not a party or privy to a
party.2 These benefits have often been denied for the sole reason
that such a person would not have been bound by a judgment in
that action adverse to his interest 3 and that granting such a wind4
fall would violate the principle that "estoppels must be mutual."
As a result, a person who has already had his "day in court" and
lost is given the opportunity to relitigate the same issues with a
different opponent who is denied the right to rely on the former
action.
This troublesome inconsistency has led several courts to repudiate the concept that issues determined in one suit cannot be
taken as conclusively established in a subsequent action unless both
parties were mutually bound by the former judgment. As such,
they have allowed a litigant to assert the findings of a previous
action regardless of the fact that the person was not a party or
privy to a party in that action and could not have been bound by
an unfavorable judgment. The decisions presented below represent a widespread dissatisfaction with the rule of mutuality, and
these will be discussed briefly before examining the approach taken
by the Nebraska courts.
II. ABANDONMENT OF THE RULE
Judicial innovations often lead to uncertainty, and the extent
to which the rule of mutuality can be disregarded in determining
the effect of prior judgments remains open to question. The requirement of mutuality was abandoned without reservation by the
1 See Schroeder v.

171.74 Acres of Land, More or Less, 318 F.2d 311

(8th Cir. 1963).
2 RESTATEMENT, JUDGMNUS
3
4

§

93 (1942).

See generally id. §§ 93-111.

See, e.g., Elder v. New York & Pennsylvania Motor Express, Inc., 284
N.Y. 350, 31 N.E.2d 188 (1940).
1 FREEMAN, JuDaMENTs § 407, at 890 (5th ed. 1925).
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court in the leading case of Bernhard v. Bank of America.5 The
defendant was there allowed to assert a decision made in a suit to
which he was neither a party nor privy to a party against a complainant who had previously litigated the issue. Justice Traynor
proclaimed that an inquiry into whether a person is bound by a
former determination depends solely on an affirmative answer to
three pertinent questions which were:
Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the
one presented in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the merits? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication? 6
The test clearly abolishes the traditional requirement of identity of
parties and extends the binding effect of a judgment by stating
that it can be used by anyone against a party who has already
litigated the issue in question.
Although the Bernhard decision was hailed a judicial triumphJ
it was also suggested that the doctrine set forth should be limited
to use by defendants while continuing to require each plaintiff to
litigate his own case." The reason for this belief is centered around
incidents such as train accidents which force a defendant to face
multiple claimants who have allegedly suffered injury. If the rule
in the Bernhard case were applied in such a situation, one adverse
judgment would be binding on the defendant as to all remaining
litigants who perhaps had abstained from presenting their claim
until a favorable judgment was rendered. Those who remained inactive could not be bound by a judgment for the defendant since
they would not have been a party to the adjudication. A result of
this type is deemed unfair since an aberrational verdict might
appear at any time that would bind the defendant in subsequent
actions without regard to the fact that he may have successfully
defended several identical claims.9
It is also feared that repeated application of such a rule would
lead to "loaded" test cases in which the prospective plaintiffs might
conspire to present their most appealing litigant at a time, under
conditions, and in a forum most favorable to all of them. On the
other hand, a defendant does not possess a comparable strategic
5 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).

6 Id. at 813, 122 P.2d at 895. (Emphasis added.)
7 The classic article which discusses the Bernhard case and the likelihood that the rule set forth should not be applied in all situations is:
Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard
Doctrine, 9 STAx. L. REv. 281 (1957).

Id. at 294.
9 Id. at 285.
8

COMMENTS
advantage, and no harm is seen in preventing a plaintiff from
merely switching defendants to retry identical issues after they
have already been decided.' 0
Notwithstanding the above view, a few courts have allowed a
plaintiff the benefits of a judgment in a prior action to which he
was not a party when it was certain that the defendant has already
had a full and fair hearing on a particular issue." In Zdanok v.
Glidden Co.,1 2 a group of employees were granted relief pursuant to
a collective bargaining agreement on the basis of a prior determination 3 involving different plaintiffs but the same issues. However, the court drew a distinction between a case dealing with
judicial construction of a contract and one requiring a jury determination of negligence. The basis for this distinction is that the
former is inherently susceptible to an objective decision whereas
the latter is subject to the varying appraisals of the facts by different juries.14
The court in United States v. United Air Lines, Inc.15 apparently disregarded the proposed defensive limitation to the Bernhard doctrine and even surpassed the limited offensive application
represented by the Zdanok decision. There, summary judgment on
the issue of liability was granted to the heirs and representatives
10 Id.at 300.
11 Professor Currie has even discarded his reasons for limiting the Bernhard Doctrine by stating that "[n]ot only is this position tainted with
cynicism; it is generalization of a flagrant kind, and I am sorry that
I ever let myself suppose that the courts would indulge in it." Currie,
Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 25, 32 (1965).

327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934 (1964).
13 Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 288 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), aff'd, 370 U.S. 530
(1962).
14 Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964), is noted in 39
12

NoTRE DAmVE LAw. 492 (1964).

The author there used the court's dis-

tinction between different types of actions to devise a rule that "whenever the subject matter of the original determination which is to be
asserted as an estoppel against one of the original parties is such as
can reasonably be said to be of a type capable of fairly objective
ascertainment and which ought not to be open to re-examination simply because of a change in parties; where there is no basic unfairness
to any party in allowing the plea; and where there was a full and fair
hearing on the merits in the original action, then the new party
should be permitted to take advantage of the original determination
as against one of the original parties regardless of the orientation of
such parties as plaintiff or defendant and notwithstanding the offensive mode of raising the plea ....

."

Id. at 497.

15 216 F. Supp. 709 (N.D. Nev. 1962), aff'd, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964),
petition for cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
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of several deceased victims of an airplane crash after a jury in
another jurisdiction had found that the tragedy was caused by the
defendant's negligence. The court expressed its approval of abandoning the rule of mutuality along with the firm belief that no
injustice was done to the defendant. 6
Repercussions will inevitably result from the total repudiation
of a concept which permeates much of the law of judgments, and
there is still support for maintaining the rule subject to certain
recognized exceptions.' 7 A reasonable prediction is that in most
jurisdictions "the mutality rule may be increasingly modified or
abandoned but that this is likely to be done gradually and with
care .... ,,-1At any rate, the existing case law in Nebraska must
be studied to determine where the state stands with regard to
this predicted development.
III.

NEBRASKA LAW

There is no controversy surrounding the general rule that a
judgment does not bind a person who was not a party to the action.'9 An established exception binds those in privity with the
16

The court expressed its confidence by saying that "the issue of liability of United Air Lines to the passengers on the plane was litigated
to the hilt, by lawyers of the highest competence in their field .....

Id. at 728. This statement indicates that this court as well as the
court in Zdanok was concerned about the same type of problem and
possibility of unfairness faced by Judge Learned Hand in a discussion
of collateral estoppel in The Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927, 929
(2d Cir. 1944) cert. denied, 323 U.S. 720 (1944), where it was said

that "[tlhe stake in the first suit may have been too small to justify
great trouble and expense in its prosecution or defense; and the
chance that a fact decided in it, even though necessary to its result,
may later become important between the parties may have been
extremely remote."

When the parties are different, the possibility of

an injustice resulting would be multiplied.
17 See Moore & Currier, Mutuality and Conclusiveness of Judgments, 35
TUL. L. REV. 301 (1961). Generally, exceptions to the mutuality rule
are concerned with instances of derivative liability.
18 JAMES, C=rn PROCEDURE. § 11.34, at 603 (1965).
See generally id. §§
11.23-11.35 for a complete discussion concerning the persons affected
by res judicata.
19 Wemmer v. Young, 167 Neb. 495, 93 N.W.2d 837 (1958). The case of
Coca-Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 Atl. 260 (1934), discussed the accepted principle that depriving a person of any opportunity to be heard would violate due process, but stated that "[t]his
reason fails when applied to one who had been a party to the former
proceedings . . . ." Id. at 130, 172 Atl. at 262. Thus, due process does
not demand that a party have his day in court against each litigant.

COMIMENTS
party named in the action, 20 and the broad definition of privity
has been said to include not only those with a definite legal relationship but those individuals who participate in the trial to such an
extent that justice requires they be bound by the determination
made therein. 21 Although these principles determine who is bound
by a judgment in addition to the named parties, it is apparent that
they do not resolve the question of whether a person is entitled to
the benefits of a favorable judgment in a prior action to which he
was not a party.
The Nebraska cases reveal that "the law of res judicata is
frequently treated as a branch of the law of estoppel and both
terms have been used indiscriminately to indicate the force and
effect of judgments and decrees.1 22 However, there is a significant distinction which should be made between res judicata as a
bar to an entire action, and res judicata with regard to particular
issues which were decided in a prior case.2 3 Attention is brought
to that fact for the sole reason that res judicata, in the strict
sense, 24 is applied to prevent a plaintiff from repeatedly attacking
a particular defendant on the same cause of action, and in such a
20 For a general statement of the rule see Summers v. Summers, 177 Neb.

389, 128 N.W.2d 829 (1964).
TS § 83, comment a (1942); accord, Independent Elevators v. Davis, 116 Neb. 397, 217 N.W. 577 (1928).
22 American Province Real Estate Corp. v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 178
Neb. 348, 351, 133 N.W.2d 466, 468 (1965). This case lends support
to the view that the parties must be substantially identical for a
judgment to have any effect in a subsequent action. However, the
case specifically held that a nominal party is not bound by the judgment rendered in an action.
23 The distinction was discussed in the famous case of Cromwell v.
County of Sac, 94 U.S. 951 (1876). It was there stated that "[ifn the
former case, the judgment, if rendered upon the merits, constitutes an
absolute bar to a subsequent action. It is a finality as to the claim
or demand in controversy, concluding parties and those in privity with
them, not only as to every matter which was offered and received to

21 See RESTATEMENT, JuDG

sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible

matter which might have been offered for that purpose ....

Such

demand or claim, having passed into judgment, cannot again be

brought into litigation between the parties in proceedings at law upon
any ground whatever.

"But where the second action between the same parties is upon
a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates
as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted,

24

upon the determination of which the finding or verdict was rendered."
Id. at 352-53.
This particular terminology was used by the court in United States v.
Cathcard, 70 F. Supp. 653 (D. Neb. 1946), in a discussion of the two
forms of res judicata.
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case, the defendant is obliged to aver that the parties are the same. 5
The perplexing question of mutuality is, of course, whether the
"particular issue" form of res judicata must necessarily be hampered by the same requirement when a fully litigated issue arises
from another action. The emphasis appears to shift in this instance
from preventing a continuous vexation of the defendant to the
principles of justice and expediency which are theoretically unaffected by a lack of identity of parties.
An early Nebraska decision held that mutuality of estoppel was
necessary for a judgment to have any binding effect in a subsequent suit.26 The more recent case of Frey v. Hauke27 indirectly
leads to the same conclusion. The plaintiff in that case was seeking
an accounting between the respective parties as partners, and he
was entitled to rely on the previous adjudication that a partnership,
in fact, existed. The rule set forth was that once a question of fact
has been decided it cannot be relitigated between the same parties.28 It can be inferred that the plaintiff would have had to litigate the issue if he had not been a party to the action in which the
question was decided.
There are also several Nebraska cases which apply the rule that
a judgment is not res judicata as to any fact at issue in subsequent
actions where neither issues nor parties are the same. 29 The lack
of identity in either respect was fatal to the litigants who were
seeking the benefits of res judicata. Furthermore, the question
involved with regard to the identity of the parties was the attempted assertion of a prior finding against one who had not participated
in the former suit. Application of res judicata in this instance
would, of course, be contrary to the Bernhard doctrine as well as
30
traditionally accepted principles.
25

In re Estate of Schuette, 138 Neb. 568, 293 N.W. 421 (1940); Burke v.
Munger, 138 Neb. 14, 292 N.W. 53 (1940); Thomas v. Thomas, 33 Neb.

26

27
28

29

30

373, 50 N.W. 170 (1891).
Densmore v. Tomer, 14 Neb. 392, 15 N.W. 734 (1883). The existence
of the same rule is apparent in Slattery v. Harley, 58 Neb. 575, 79 N.W.
151 (1899), and Monroe v. Hanson, 47 Neb. 30, 66 N.W. 12 (1896).
171 Neb. 852, 108 N.W.2d 228 (1961).
This principle was also applied in Gilcrist v. Wright, 169 Neb. 799, 101
N.W.2d 158 (1960); and Shepard v. City of Friend, 141 Neb. 866, 5
N.W.2d 108 (1942).
Kuhl v. School Dist. No. 76 of Wayne County, 155 Neb. 357, 51 N.W.2d
746 (1952); Gulizia v. Royal Indem. Co., 139 Neb. 832, 299 N.W. 220
(1941); Plattsmouth Bridge Co. v. Turner, 128 Neb. 738, 260 N.W. 562
(1935).
See text accompanying note 6 supra, and note 19 supra.

COMMENTS
Although the recent cases do not directly present the question
of mutuality, the language consistently used by the court would
seem to leave little doubt as to the vitality of the requirement in
Nebraska. There is, however, a frequently applied rule of law
which, in light of recent developments, is worthy of discussion.
It has been stated that:
Where cases are interwoven and interdependent and the controversy involved has already been considered and determined by
the court in former proceedings involving one of the parties now
before it, the court has the right to examine its own records and
take judicial notice
of its own proceedings and judgments in the
former action. 3 '

The above rule will be referred to as the "interdependent rule"
and can be broken down as follows: (1) The rule applies to interwoven and interdependent cases. (2) Only one of the parties to
the former action need be before the court. (3) The existence of the
first two points entitles, if not requires, the court to take judicial
notice of its own prior proceedings. The second point at least
raises the inference that the requirement of mutuality may be circumvented in some situations.
The prerequisite for applying this rule is that the cases involved must be interwoven and interdependent. The courts profess that the application of the rule is "warranted from the necessity of giving effect to former holdings which finally decide questions of fact and law." 32 A merger of this reason with the plain
meaning of "interwoven" and "interdependent" signifies that the
cases which fall into this category must be related or connected as
to the issues presented, and that the decisions made with regard to
those issues should be consistent. This construction of the "interdependent rule" is supported by Cover v. Platte Valley Pub. Power
3 3 which is a significant case for two reasons. First, it
& Irr. Dist.,
provides some indication as to how broadly "interwoven" and "interdependent" may be defined. Second, it constitutes a vivid illustration of the requirement that only one party to the former action need be present to entitle the court to hold that the issues have
been conclusively determined.
The court in Cover held that the trial court committed error
31

32
33

Johnson v. Marsh, 146 Neb. 257, 262, 19 N.W.2d 366, 369 (1945). (Emphasis added.) (The court took judicial notice of prior cases denying
collateral attacks upon probate proceedings in a certain estate to sustain a demurrer to the complaint.)
Id. at 263, 19 N.W.2d at 369.
162 Neb. 146, 75 N.W.2d 661 (1956).
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34
in not taking judicial notice of its own records in a previous case
involving the defendant wherein he had been adjudged negligent
in constructing and maintaining an inadequate flood-water drain.
Although the plaintiff was not a party to the first proceeding, it
was concluded that to allow the defendant to again adjudicate the
question of negligence "would be a travesty upon justice and permit a trifling with judgments duly rendered according to law."3 5
Thus, the only question for determination in the second suit was
whether the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the
No mention was made of
injury and the extent of the damages.
36
res judicata or the mutuality rule.

The only discernible connection of real significance between the
Cover case and the prior action is that both plaintiffs were similarly situated and based their claim for relief upon the continuing
negligence of the defendant.3 7 Beyond those facts it is difficult to
isolate any reason which made these two cases distinctively interwoven and interdependent, and it appears logical to assume that
any such plaintiff who alleged injury would have been entitled to
a directed verdict on the issue of negligence. Consequently, a comparison of the Cover case and those abolishing mutuality leads to
the conclusion that the interdependent rule was used merely as a
different means to the same end.
A factor of some importance is that the first action was brought
to obtain an injunction requiring the defendant to increase the
carrying capacity of the drain as well as to recover damages resulting from a flood. Thus, the issue of negligence was decided by
a judge instead of a jury, and because of that fact, it was undoubtFaught v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 147 Neb. 1032, 25
N.W.2d 889 (1947).
35 Cover v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irr. Dist., 162 Neb. 146, 154, 75
N.W.2d 661, 668 (1956).
36 If the court intended its holding to be consistent with the rule of
mutuality, some support can be found in a New York case. In Town
of Vienna v. State, 203 Misc. 1053, 119 N.Y.S.2d 545 (Ct. Cl. 1953), the
court took judicial notice of prior cases which established the defendant's negligence, but denied that it was doing so on the theory of res
34

37

judicata since there was no identity between parties plaintiff. However, the parties had agreed beforehand that the state's liability was
to be determined by another case arising out of the same flood. The
finding of negligence was merely omitted from the stipulated facts
upon which the complainant was seeking damages.
Although the court in Faught v. Platte Valley Pub. Power & Irr. Dist.,
147 Neb. 1032, 1035, 25 N.W.2d 889, 891 (1947), mentioned the fact that

Cover's land was adjacent to the plaintiff's, the recovery sought by
Cover in his case was for damages resulting from a different flood
than that complained of in the Faught case.

COMMENTS
edly much easier to rule in the subsequent suit that the question
had been settled in the prior action. Nevertheless, that does not
detract from the fact that the plaintiff in the Cover case was not a
party to the former action, and according to orthodox principles,
would have had to litigate the issue of negligence before a jury
since the suit by Cover was for damages only.
The final element of the "interdependent rule" is judicial notice. The early cases in Nebraska denied trial courts the right to
take judicial notice of any prior proceeding in a different case.3 8
The exception to this general rule was formulated to allow such for
interwoven and interdependent cases within the same court,3 9 and
there appears to be no demanding reason to question the propriety of the practice at this time.
The important question is whether the factor of judicial notice
limits the application of the rule to situations where the same court
hears both cases which are considered interwoven and interdependent. Certainly, interwoven and interdependent cases must be
capable of existing in two or more different courts for the simple
reason that the location or identity of the court should, in itself,
have no bearing upon the relationship of one controversy to
40
another.
Since judicial notice is specifically limited to interwoven and
interdependent cases within the same court, it is unlikely that the
courts will ever be granted the right to take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts.41 However, that limitation should not
Gibson v. Sexson, 82 Neb. 475, 118 N.W. 77 (1908) (Would not take
notice of proceedings in a different court.); Allison v. Fidelity Mut.
Fire Ins. Co., 74 Neb. 366, 104 N.W. 753 (1905) (Court would not take
judicial notice of another case within the same court.).
39 Witzenburg v. State, 140 Neb. 171, 299 N.W. 533 (1941). (Trial court
took judicial notice of a prior case to sustain a demurrer on the basis
of res judicata where the plaintiff, of necessity, based his causes of
action upon the judgment and record of another case and was precluded from arguing contrary to that judgment and record although
the defendant was not a party to the previous action.)
40 It is submitted that the relevant fact in the Cover case was that the
plaintiff there was in the position to be damaged in the same manner
as was the plaintiff in the previous action. The situation is thus
analogous to that in United States v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.
38

Supp. 709 (N.D. Nev. 1962), affd, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964) where

41

all of the passengers happened to be in the same aircraft, and all met
their death as the result of one negligent act. That case was not
brought in the same court as the original action, and a limitation of
that nature would appear to be unfounded.
Apparently the federal courts are not restricted in this manner. See
Holmes v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 971 (N.D. Ga. 1964). (Judicial
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logically hinder the operation of the rule that judicial notice is
only a substitute for actual evidence, that can be pleaded and
proven. 42 They are simply alternative means by which a former
judgment may be brought before the court as indicated by the
following statement:
The pleadings and judgment, but not the opinion of the appellate
court, may be introduced in evidence to support a plea of res
judicata. However, under the circumstances here shown, that
would not be necessary because the trial court was duty bound to
take judicial notice thereof.43
The quotation was taken from a case applying the "interdependent rule" but in which both parties had been adverse litigants
in a prior proceeding. A person who was not a party to the
former action would no doubt have difficulty in persuading the
court to rule that the evidence he entered concerning that action
should produce a judgment based upon the principle of res judicata. 44 However, a person should be allowed to convince the
court that his case and a prior one are interwoven and interdependent, and as a result, only one of the parties to the prior action
need be before the court for determination made therein to be
conclusive. 45 If such can be done, it makes little difference whether
the reason is labeled res judicata, collateral estoppel, or simply
justice according to the facts as it evidently was in the Cover case.
The purpose of this discussion is to illustrate that the rule can
be viewed as nothing more than a restricted version of the doctrine
set forth by Justice Traynor. 46 It must be mentioned that not all
of the cases which apply the interdependent rule present the problem of mutuality nor do even most of them. 47 The point to be

42

43

44

45

46
47

notice of prior suits against the defendant in other jurisdictions was
taken, and the suit was held barred by res judicata.)
Board of Educ. Lands & Funds v. Gillett, 158 Neb. 558, 64 N.W.2d 105
(1954); Piechota v. Rapp, 148 Neb. 442, 27 N.W.2d 682 (1947).
Wischmann v. Raikes, 168 Neb. 728, 750-51, 97 N.W.2d 551, 565 (1959).
(Court took judicial notice of plaintiff's prior action in obtaining an
injunction, and concluded that he was barred from bringing a second
suit for damages since that was an issue which could have been
litigated.)
See text accompanying notes 27-29 supra. But see Witzenburg v. State,
140 Neb. 171, 299 N.W. 533 (1941).
The litigant would, in effect, be complying with the rule set down in
Schuster v. Douglas, 156 Neb. 484, 56 N.W.2d 618 (1953), which requires a person who relies upon the rule of res judicata to bring such
facts into the record as will affirmatively show that the opposing
parties relation to the former action was such as to make the judgment therein conclusive of the matter in controversy.
See text accompanying note 6 supra.
E.g., Anderson v. Anderson, 155 Neb. 1, 50 N.W.2d 224 (1951).

COMMENTS
stressed is that the Cover case does present the mutuality problem,
and it would be extremely difficult to criticize it on the basis that
it was unjust to the opposing party. Whether the doctrine will be
extended and refined to provide an established formula for disregarding mutuality depends, of course, upon the direction taken by
the courts.
rV.

CONCLUSION

Recent courts and writers have severely criticized the rule of
mutuality. As an abstract principle of justice, it has been termed
a "tinkling cymbal, an empty and fatuous formula productive of
more harm than good." 48 There are those who would disagree, but
it seems reasonable to say that justice does not always demand that
a person prove his own case or defend his own rights after either
one of these has been clearly and fairly decided. All justice demands is that one party not be allowed an unconscionable advantage over another.
Perhaps Nebraska is not as strongly bound by the rule of mutuality as some cases indicate. If this is so, the challenge lies in
the formulation of sound principles through which courts can
decide whether a person should be entitled to the benefits of a
judgment when he would not have been bound by a decision adverse to his interest. The alternative is to adhere to a strict requirement of mutuality which is unnecessary, undesirable, and
against the trend of authority.
Gailyn L. Larsen 67

48

Currie, supra note 7, at 322.

